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TRADING STAMPS: UNFAIR COMPETITION?
The inherent conflict between monopoly and a system of fair
competition is found at the core of many economic questions. Re-
cently this has been demonstrated by the increase in litigation con-
cerning the question of whether the giving of trading stamps violates
minimum pnce level provisions of state fair trade acts and state unfair
practices acts.1
State fair trade acts provide that when a manufacturer and a
retailer enter into a resale price contract establishing a minimum price
below which the retailer cannot sell, all other retailers in the state who
have notice of this contract are prohibited from selling below this
price.2 State unfair practices acts, also known as sale below cost acts,
'The giving of trading stamps is a common practice in commercial trans-
actions. This practice has grown in recent years until it has become a lucrative
business, giving rise to several large stamp companies. It is used extensively in.
many large chain stores, and has become as popular -w-iR ifferhnt. as it ' 'is with
housewives. It also has become popular with the courts. The Pennsylvania Law
Review, which quoted the Wall Street Journal, summed it up this way, "Assailed
by some as a costly device that raises family food bills and hotly defended by
others as a perfectly legal promotional tool' trading stamps have become a
center of controversy in the merchandising field. Though stamp plans have
en oed a rapid upsurge since World War II, the idea itself is over fifty years
old.' Note, 105 U. Pa. L. Rev. 242 (1956).
The economic advantages of offering trading stamps are as hotly debated as
their legality. Those arguing for trading stamps point out that the stamps
result in an increase in business for the retailer; that, therefore, the retailer has a
lower unit cost with nsmg profits, and can more than adequately cover the cost
of the stamp plan; that the consumer can obtain a wide choice of merchandise
without having to make a cash outlay; and that because trading stamps create a
large demand, manufacturers and eventually the entire economy will benefit.
Those arguing against trading stamps point out that while the first retailer in an
area may enjoy a temporary increase in business, soon most other retailers in that
area adopt stamps, and after the demand eventually returns to normal these
retailers must continue using stamps to maintain business they formerly had; that
stamps are therefore just another item of cost which results in lower profits to the
retailer or higher prices to the consumer; and that the consumer does not get a
large choice of merchandise because the goods are usually things he doesn't
need or want. According to most surveys taken, those stores which offer stamps
have the same retail prices as those stores which do not offer them. This is
partially explained by the idea that many retailers purchase stamps with funds
already earmarked for advertising. Charvat, The Economcs of Trading Stamps,
7 J. Pub. L. 450 (1958).
2State legislative sanction, known as fair trade legislation, was first given to
resale price maintenance agreements in Califoria n 1931. Cal. Stat. ch. 260
(1933), as amended, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§16900-05. These acts were upheld
by the United States Supreme Couirt in 1936 in so far as the goods were strictly
in intrastate commerce. Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram Distillers Corp.,
229 U.S. 183 (1936). By 1941 all but four states had enacted fair trade statutes
based on the Califorma model. 1 Trade Reg. Rep. §3075 (1960). These resale
prce contracts can be enforced agamnst retailers who are not a party to the
contract because nonsiguer provisions were included i most state fair trade laws.
Typical of these nonsigner provisions is Ohio Rev. Code §1333.07 (1953), which
provides that "whoever knowingly and wilfully advertises, offers for sale or sells
any commodity at less than the nmmum price stipulated in any contract entered
into under section 1333.06 of the Revised Code, whether such person is or is
(Continued on next page)
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provide that no person engaged in business shall sell, offer for sale or
advertise for sale any product at less than cost for the purpose of
injuring a competitor and destroying competition.,3 While unfair prac-
tices acts apply to all goods traded freely on the open market, fair trade
acts apply only to those goods bearing the trade mark of the manu-
facturer.4 These two types of acts have one common provision; they
establish a minimum pnce below which a product cannot be sold.
The basic issue 5 involved in trading stamp litigation is: Does the giving
of trading stamps with merchandise sold at a minimum level result in a
sale below the minimum established by a resale price contract in viola-
tion of fair trade acts, or result in a sale below cost in violdtion of
unfair practices acts?
Since most goods are sold at a profit, the giving of. trading stamps
with merchandise priced at a mnimum level is not a frequent com-
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
not a party to such a contract, is engaging in unfair competition and unfair trade
practices and is liable to any person damaged thereby." A number of states,
however, have held these nonsigner provisions unconstitutional. E.g., Arkansas-
Umon Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. White River Distrib., 224 Ark. 558, 275 S.W.2d
455 (1955); Flonda-Laquor Store, Inc. v. Continental Distilling Corp., 40 So. 2d
371 (Fla. 1949); Michtgan-Shakespeare Co. v. Lippmans Tool Shop Sporting
Goods Co., 334 Mich. 109, 54 N.W.2d 268 (1952).
Since 1911, resale price maintenance contracts on goods traveling in inter-
state commerce were illegal. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373
(1911). But in 1937 Congress passed the Miller-Tydings Act, which.enabled
states to apply their resale price maintenance laws to products resold within the
states borders after moving in interstate commerce. 50 Stat. 693 (1937), 15
U.S.C. §1 (1952), amending the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C.
§§1-7 (1952). To overcome some difficulty remaining in operating fair trade laws
on interstate commerce, Congress later passed the McGuire Act., whch specifically
exempts the nonsigner provisions from the operation of federal anti-trust laws and
declares that fair trade laws are not a burden on interstate commerce. 66 Stat.
632 (1952), 15 U.S.C. §45(3) (1952).
3 For example, Ky. Rev. Stat. 365.030, provides that "no person en-
gaged in business within this state shall sell, offer for sale or advertise for sale
any article or product, or' service or output of a sprvice trade, at less than the cost
thereof to such vendor, or give, offer to give or advertise the intent to give away
any article or product, or service or output of a service trade, for the purpose of
injuring competitors and destroying competition."
4 In 1947, Eastman Kodak Company had resale price contracts on its color
film, but since Eastman Kodak was the only producer of such film, it was held
that the film was not in "fair and open competition" with other products and the
contracts were invalidated. Phillips and Duncan, Marketing: Principles and
Methods 678 n.29 (1951).
5 There is another question of equal importance concerning the practice of
giving trading stamps: Are those statutes which directly and unequivocally
prohibit the giving of trading stamps unconstitutional? Some states, including
Kentucky, have held such statutes unconstitutional, because no authority exists
upon which they can be passed. They bear no relation to the general welfare
because there is no concern for healtb, safety or morals, nor do they bear any
relation to the prevention of fraud or deceit because the trading stamp practice is
familiar to all. Lawton v. Stewart Dry Goods Co., 197 Ky. 394, 247 S.W 14
(1923); Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. McBride, 307 Mass. 408. 30 N.E.2d 269
(1940). Wisconsin, however, has held that such a statute is a valid and reasonable
exercise of the police power and not discriminatory, and therefore constitutional,
Schuster i Co. v. Steffes, 238 Wis. 41, 295 N.W 737 (1941).
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mercial practice. This practice however, if upheld by the courts, can
be used effectively by retailers who wish to lower pnces to entice
customers, and yet continue to comply with the minimum price levels
established by these two acts. If this practice is not upheld and an
injunction is issued, the restraint does not prohibit the giving of trading
stamps except with a sale at a minimum price. While this affects only
a small proportion of the trading stamp program, it deprives retailers
of a very useful competitive practice.
JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO TE PROBLEM
Five states have based decisions on fair trade acts, three of which
have ruled that the giving of trading stamps does not result in a sale
below the minimum resale price.6 Three states have based decisions on
unfair practices acts, unanimously ruling that the giving of trading
stamps does not result in a sale below cost.1 These decisions turn on
the solution of three main questions: (1) whether the practice of
giving trading stamps should be treated as a cash discount, which
according to standard accounting procedure does not result in a reduc-
tion in the purchase price; (2) whether the practice of giving trading
stamps is a promotional device which does not result in a reduction in
price; and (3) whether the practice of giving trading stamps results in
a discount of such significance as to require judicial recognition.
The Cash Discount
Long before fair trade acts or unfair practices acts were adopted,
the practice of giving trading stamps was held to be a cash discount.8
Now, as then, a cash discount is treated in standard accounting practice
as a reward for prompt payment in cash which does not result in a
6 That the giving of trading stamps does not result in a sale below the
minimum resale pnce level: Californa-Weco Prods. Co. v. Mid-City Cut Rate
Drugs, 55 Cal. 2d 684, 131 P.2d 856 (1942); New Hampshire-Corning Glass
Works v. Max Dichter Co., 161 A.2d 569 (N.H. 1960); Peinslvania-Grever v.
Amiencan Stores Co., B87 Pa. 206, 127 A.2d 694 (1956); Bnsto!-Myers Co. v. Lit
Bros. 336 Pa 81 6 A.2d 843 (1939). That the giving of trading stamps does
result in a sale below the mmium resale price level: Massachusetts-Colgate
Palmolive Co. v. Elm Farm Foods Co., 148 N.E.2d 861 (Mass. 1958); New York-
Bristol-Myers Co. v. Picker, 302 N.Y. 61, 96 N.E.2d 177 (1950).
7 Califora-Food & Grocery Bureau v. Garfield, 20 Cal. 2d 228, 125 P.2d
3 (1942); New Jersez.-Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Margettes, 15 N.J. 203, 104
A.2d 310 (1954); Oklahoma-Safeway Stores v. Oklahoma-Retail Grocers Ass'n,
322 P.2d 179 (Okla. 1957). Utah-Utah Code, Commerce and Trade 13-5-9
amended Utah s Unfair Practices Act to make trading stamps a reduction of the
selling pnce by the amount of such cash discount. Before tis amendment, Utah
courts consistently held that the giving of trading' stamps with a sale at the
nmmuum price was not violative of the Unfair Practicec Act. Trade Comm n v.
Bush, 123 Utah 302, 259 P.2d 304 (1953); State v. Holtgreve, 58 Utah 563, 200
Pac. 894 (1921).8 Ex parte Hutchinson, 137 Fed. 949 (C.C.N.D. Wash. 1904); Winston v.
Beeson, 135 N.C. 271, 47 S.E. 457 (1904).
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price reduction 9 In Sperry 6 Hutchinson Co. v. Margettes, a New
Jersey court held that the giving of trading stamps results in a cash
discount, which is "a term of payment merely, not a price adjustment;
it is a mode of financing, not a reduction in the price."'" Similarly, in
Safeway Stores v. Oklahoma Retail Grocers Ass'n, the court held that
the giving of trading stamps is a cash discount, and based its decision
on a rule of long standing that cash discounts are a cost of selling
rather than a reduction in purchase price."
The treatment of trading stamps as a cash discount was attacked in
Colgate Palmolive Co. v. Max Dzchter 6 Sons. 2 The court pointed out
that the giving of trading stamps operates as a trade discount as well as
a cash discount. Trade discounts include quantity and quota discounts.
While not defined by this court, a trade discount is usually described
as a reduction in price given to a certain class of buyers for performing
marketing functions.'" Thus a manufacturer may give a wholesaler a
reduction in the list price because the manufacturer is spared the
expense of making numerous small sales to retailers. A quantity dis-
count is described as a reduction in price given to any buyer who pur-
chases in large quantities. Because a trade discount or quantity
discount is given to induce buyers to purchase in large quantities, the
price is reduced before the sale is effected. This discount appears in the
books as a reduction in the purchase price. In addition to trade and
quantity discounts, the court mentioned the quota discount, which is
usually described as a reduction in price given to any buyer who agrees
to purchase a certain amount dunng a stated period. The price is
reduced retroactively when purchases reach the agreed amount within
the time period. Combining the features of the quantity and quota
discounts, and labeling the combination a trade discount, the court
was able to conclude that the giving of trading stamps results in a
reduction in the purchase price. The court recognized in the trading
stamp program features of the quantity discount, because a customer
cannot redeem his stamps book for merchandise until it is filled with
stamps, and to accomplish this the holder must make numerous small
or several large purchases. The court also recognized in the program
features of the quota discount, because the customer receives his dis-
count retroactively, only when he has collected the requisite number
of stamps.14 This holding is weak, however, because the court went
9 Montgomery, Auditing Theory and Practice 499-500 (2d ed. 1918).
10 15 N.J. 203, 104 A.2d 310, 312 (1954).
11322 P.2d 179 (Okla. 1957).
32 142 F Supp. 545 (D. Mass. 1956).
13 Phillips & Duncan, op. cit. supra note 4, at 669.
'4 Colgate Palmolive Co. v. Max Dichter & Sons, 142 F Supp. 545 (D. Mass.
1956).
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beyond the usual definition of quantity discount. This type of discount
is usually restricted to transactions involving large purchases of one
particular article. Because trading stamps are given on many articles
at the same time, the label, quantity discount, is inaccurately applied.
By debating whether the giving of trading stamps is a cash discount
which may result in a reduction in the purchase price, courts have
become unduely involved with accounting procedure. This is un-
fortunate because accounting procedure has the primary purpose of
obtaining uniformity in the recording of business transactions, and this
purpose bears no relation to the question of whether the giving of
trading stamps results in a reduction below a minimum price level. By
looking to accounting procedure, courts ultimately decide the trading
stamp issue solely upon the bookkeeping methods used by the business
issuing stamps. For example, if a stamp worth one cent is given with a
one-dollar purchase the seller can enter the sale at one dollar and show
the offset of one cent under expenses, which would not be a reduction
in price. Another seller can enter the sale at ninety-nine cents, which
would be a reduction in price. Labelling the stamps a "cash discount"
or a "trade discount" should not be the basis of decision, for the result
in each case would depend entirely upon how the seller keeps his books.
The Promotional Device
The use of trading stamps has been justified as a promotional
device designed to attract customers. One courti 5 compared the trading
stamp program to such commonly employed devices as free parking and
free delivery service. These devices do not violate fair trade and unfair
practices acts even though they result in a monetary benefit to the
consumer. Trading stamps, like free parking and delivery service, are
given on a lump sum basis for all articles purchased and bear no
relation to the value of a particular article. But trading stamps do
differ from free parking and free delivery service. Actually, a closer
analogy can be drawn to "loss leader" selling, which is an illegal
promotional device. This is the sale of an article below the minimum
resale price or below cost to attract customers who while purchasing
that article may purchase others. Trading stamps are issued on a
percentage basis, thereby establishing a direct relationship between the
value of the stamps and the cost of an article. Similarly, in a loss
leader sale the price of an article is directly reduced. A direct relation-
ship exists between the value of the discount the customer receives
and the cost of the article.
i5 Weco Prods. Co. v. Mid-City Cut Rate Drug Stores, 55 Cal. 2d 684, 131
P,2d 856 (1942).
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The De Minimus Argument
Pennsylvania courts' 6 have held that trading stamps do not violate
minimum price levels because of the insignificance of the discount. The
court recognized that a trading stamp usually results in a discount of no
more than one cent on a dollar. The decision was based on the maxim,
de mimmus non curet lex, that courts do not consider insignificant
matters. But in view of the magnitude of the trading stamp business,
the de mmzmus argument is nothing more than a fiction employed to
evade the issues involved. If the value of a stamp or the value of the
merchandise received for the stamp should increase, when would the
discount become significant?
L.GIsLATIVE INTENT
Unfortunately most courts decided the trading stamp issue without
looking to the intent of the legislature in passing these two acts.17
The reason given for adopting the fair trade acts is to protect the
good name of the manufacturer. 18 If trade-marked products are sold
at a very low price, the consumer will infer that these products are
inferior. It is doubtful, however, that any sale at a reduced level will
destroy the good name of the manufacturer, and more doubtful that
the nominal reduction in price effected by the giving of a stamp will
similarly discredit the product.
Although the stated purpose of these acts is to protect the good
name of the manufacturer, the real purpose is to allow manufacturers
or retailers to set pnces and control retail competition.' 9 The fair trade
acts began to appear as a result of lobbying by one main pressure
group.2 The National Association of Retail Druggists mobilized
political opinion and pushed fair trade acts through most state legisla-
tures before organized resistance could develop.2' Anti-trust legislation
16 Gever v. American Stores Co., 887 Pa. 206, 127 A.2d 694 (1956); Bristol-
Myers v. Lit Bros., 336 Pa. 81, 6 A.2d 843 (1939).
77 One court did look to the legislative intent. Bristol-Myers Co. v. Picker,
302 N.Y. 61, 96 N.E.2d 177 (1950). Although the dissenting judge in the
Safeway case stated that he was concerned with the meaning of the Oklahoma
Unfair Practices Act as intended by the legislature. he based his dissent upon the
literal working of the act, pointing out that the act mn no way authorizes discounts
for cash in retail sales. Safeway Stores v. Oklahoma Retail Grocers Ass n, 322
P.2d 179, 187 (Okla. 1957).
Is Lynch, The Concentration of Economic Power 144 (1946).
'9 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Federal legislation was also obtained in this same manner. The Miller-
Tydings Act was passed as a rider to the District of Columbia appropriation bill.
At tis time, President Roosevelt indicated that he would have vetoed it had it
been a separate bill. Tis Miller-Tydings Act repealed part of the Sherman Anti-
Trust Act. Until passage of the state fair trade acts all price fixing agreements
(Continued on next page)
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prohibits retailers from entenng into pnce-fixang agreements among
themselves. This is known as horizontal pnce-fixng. After fair trade
acts were adopted, a retailer could accomplish the same result by
entering into an agreement with a manufacturer who could enforce the
agreement on all other retailers in the state. This practice is known
as vertical price-fixang. Thus the fair trade acts give retailers legislative
warrant to do vertically what is forbidden horizontally.22
The unfair practices acts developed contemporaneously with the
fair trade acts. 23 The reason given for adopting the unfair practices acts
is to protect merchants from cut-throat competition. Passed during the
depression of the 1930's, these acts were designed to protect merchants
from being "squeezed out" by large retailers.24 Most of these acts
require an intent to injure competitors and destroy competition. 25
Specifically, the acts are intended to prevent the "loss leader" type of
sale.26 Trading stamps, however, do not fall within the classification of
"cut-throat" competitive practices; they are not offered with an intent
to injure competitors and destroy competition. Although these acts
have the stated purpose of prohibiting cut-throat competition, their
effect is to restrict all low-level competitive pricing by requiring all
businesses to observe a price minimum on any article.
The purpose of the above discussion is not to launch an attack on
these two acts, but to demonstrate that they are designed to discourage,
rather than encourage competition. To limit competition further by
prohibiting trading stamps only compounds this error. It seems obvious
that the small businesses that have instigated trading stamp litigation
are hiding behind these two acts to escape competition. Faced with
the ever increasing popularity of trading stamps, these merchants fear
the loss of customers and the profits that accompany them. While
these merchants should be protected, they should not be given immunity
from all business competition. Competition is the life of the trade.
No statute should be interpreted to outlaw it; no public policy is sound
which stifles it.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals recently had the opportunity to
debate the merits of certain provisions of our fair trade act 2 7 It did not
have the opportunity to decide this particular trading stamp issue.
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
were illegal. With passage of this amendment all retailers and manufacturers
who entered into resale pnce maintenance contracts under authority of state fair
trade acts were exempt from prosecution. Lynch, op. cit. supra note 18, at 149.2 2 Lynch, op. cit. supra note 18. at 145.
23 Grether, Price Control Under Fair Trade Legislation 36 (1939).
24 Phillips and Duncan, op. cit. supra note 13, at 683.25 See, e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. 365.030.
26 Grether, op. cit. supra note 23, at 32-38.
27 Qeneral B.er. Co. y, Amnrican Buyers Coop., 316 S.W.241 354 (Ky. 1958).
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When this opportunity is presented, the court should weigh fully the
basic policy conflict involved, monopoly versus a system of fair com-
petition, and reconsidcr a statement rcccntly made by the court in
discussing another aspect of the fair trade act:
Our Bill of rights declares as one of "the grcat and essential prin-
ciples of liberty and free govcnmcnt" and as "inherent and inalienable
the right of acquiring and protecting property." This is free
enterprise. Our economic system is founded upon competition-the
"life of trade." It is an establishcd principle that the constitutional
guaranty of the right of property protects it not only from confiscation
by legislative edicts and from the physical taking for public or private
use, but also from any unjustifiable impairment or abridgement of
this right, such as depriving the owner of any of its essential attributes
or such as restricts or interrupts its common, necessary or profitable
use.2
Joe C. Savage
28 Id. at 360.
